I just finished reading Joel Brinkley's book Cambodia's Curse: A Modern History of Development for my Independent Study Seminar. Although the writing is honestly a bit elementary (which also on the other hand opens it up to a wider audience), the book does provide a wealth of information. A wealth of information, except that (in my opinion) he fails to organize his chapters well with subject headings or at least string the book chronologically.
There are a few solitary sentences of the book that I find particularly problematic (for example on page 5 when Brinkley states that modern Cambodia has not changed since the Middle Ages), but besides this, Brinkley has researched and knows Cambodia well. Because of his vast experience in Cambodia, Brinkley has a tendency to over-assume and make blanket statement about numerous aspects of Cambodian society and government. Although I am no expert on Cambodian history and cannot directly refute any of his statements, his language is rather dogmatic.
The overwhelming majority of the book covers Cambodian history after independence from France in 1953, with only a few references to the ancient Khmer Empire and French influence on Cambodia. Much of the book covers the U.N. Occupation of Cambodia (and its failure to do anything substantial except help with the first free elections in 1993, according to Brinkley) in the early 90s and the corruption that is embedded in the government and how this adversely affects the people. The picture that Brinkley paints of Cambodia is, as I assumed before reading, very grim. His chapters go in circles describing the awful corruption that occurs within the government, and how unfortunately, NGOs and aid organizations (from grassroots to the World Bank) actually indirectly encourage this corruption rather than hinder it (which is debatable). Corruption, he describes, is an inherent feature of the Cambodian government today and functions like a hierarchical patronage system, similar to that during the Khmer Empire.
One offshoot about corruption that greatly intrigued me was Cambodia's illegal logging. Cambodian wood is absolutely stunning with unique coloration, and needless to say: much nicer than anything at IKEA. Deforestation continues to be a massive problem, and in top of this, the government is extremely tangled in a net of corruption so that NGOs, government aid, loans, etc. cannot even help the problem. The Cambodian government even reports faulty statistics on how much of the Cambodian forests are left. The International Monetary Fund found
that only 1.7-3.4% of Cambodia still had primary growth (200 year old+) forests, but the
Cambodia Forest Ministry stated there was 59%--a huge difference (the actual number is likely somewhere in-between, closer to the IMF's estimation) (Brinkley 292). As for forest cover, the U.N. reported that today Cambodia's land is 57% forested (in 2010), although this estimate likely includes tree plantations. In 1990, the number was 73%. The World Bank tried to funnel money to the save the forests, only to have their money squandered through systematic governmental corruption.
Still in 1995 after U.N. occupation, Cambodian military was illegally exporting teak, rosewood, and mahogany-like lumber to Thailand, raking in about $20 million a month (99, 157). One haul of illegal timber meant for Vietnam alone cost $13 million (270). Brinkley describes how military forces will come in the middle of the night to set aside land for logging. He depicts one incident in 2004 in which 800 villagers camped in a forest to prevent it from being clear cut, only to have a hand grenade thrown at them in the middle of the night (no one was killed) (176). In December 2002, 150 Cambodians protested outside of the Forestry and Wildlife Ministry against the deforestation and loss of livelihood--only to be attacked by the police leaving seven wounded and one dead. A lot of the loggers will donate money to supporting governmental public works, and therefore gain free reign to the forests. Acquiring this status only takes $100,000. The Cambodian government has authorized 3-4 million cubic meters of illegal logging, with the international NGO Global Witness stating that Hun Sen's 4,000 men bodyguard unit "serves as a nationwide timber trafficking service." In fact, Global Witness was denounced by Hun Sen who threatened to terminate the workers' visas and sue the NGO (177).
There are a few solitary sentences of the book that I find particularly problematic (for example on page 5 when Brinkley states that modern Cambodia has not changed since the Middle Ages), but besides this, Brinkley has researched and knows Cambodia well. Because of his vast experience in Cambodia, Brinkley has a tendency to over-assume and make blanket statement about numerous aspects of Cambodian society and government. Although I am no expert on Cambodian history and cannot directly refute any of his statements, his language is rather dogmatic.
The overwhelming majority of the book covers Cambodian history after independence from France in 1953, with only a few references to the ancient Khmer Empire and French influence on Cambodia. Much of the book covers the U.N. Occupation of Cambodia (and its failure to do anything substantial except help with the first free elections in 1993, according to Brinkley) in the early 90s and the corruption that is embedded in the government and how this adversely affects the people. The picture that Brinkley paints of Cambodia is, as I assumed before reading, very grim. His chapters go in circles describing the awful corruption that occurs within the government, and how unfortunately, NGOs and aid organizations (from grassroots to the World Bank) actually indirectly encourage this corruption rather than hinder it (which is debatable). Corruption, he describes, is an inherent feature of the Cambodian government today and functions like a hierarchical patronage system, similar to that during the Khmer Empire.
Cambodian Rosewood, taken from a website of a man who says that it is endangered due to "general clearing of the land" and not the small amount of exports. I beg to differ. |
Illegal logging on a mass scale in Cambodia has its roots during the Khmer Rouge. During the Khmer Rouge's reign, which officially started in 1975, a lot of their funding came from illegal logging and wood exports to China and Thailand. China was actually a supporter of the Khmer Rouge, and essentially funded Pol Pot's luxury jungle villa. In fact, illegal logging supported the Khmer Rouge until it officially left Cambodia in 1993. That's right: contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge was still an active force in Cambodia until mid-1996 when Prime Minister Hun Sen offered them amnesty, and then basically inactive when Pol Pot died in April 1998.
The remnants of what was once a tree. |
Most recently, NPR released a story about Chinese growth and the impact this has on Cambodian logging. Because Thailand, a country with similar wood, has placed and enforced strict regulations about their wood leaving the country, Cambodia faces extra pressure to supply the Chinese market. Moreover, China is one of the biggest foreign aid donors to Cambodia. But when it comes to illegal logging: in a country with one of the lowest GDPs in the world, who wouldn't try and make money any way possible? And with stories about journalists who uncover the illegal logging being killed, who is going to tell? And with NGOs who report the problem being threatened to leave, what can we do?
[Shameless self promotion: Check out what I wrote about deforestation in Alaska last semester!]
[Shameless self promotion: Check out what I wrote about deforestation in Alaska last semester!]
Works Cited:
Brinkley, J. (2011). Cambodia's Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land. New York, New York: PublicAffairs.
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