China and Cambodia, sitting in a tree

One of the most circulated pictures depicting Sino-Cambodian
relations. Prince Sihanouk and Mao Zedong in 1956. Taken
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mao_Sihanouk.jpg

China and Cambodia have had a long, interconnected history. Today, it is China that exerts imperialistic hegemony over Cambodia as opposed to the globe's normal imperialistic culprit: the United States. I am primary focused on the more recent history of Sino-Cambodian relations. Cambodia was first inhabited by people from what is now Southeastern China perhaps as long as 4,000 years ago, although no one is exactly sure (Gerd et. al.). This led to a small minority of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia’s population—many of whom were killed during the Khmer Rouge as they were the elite and intellectual. 

Khmer Rouge and Chinese Official pose together. Taken from
http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/blog/2012/05/sar-kim-lamouth
-proves-amenable-witness-examination-proceeds-smoothly-0

China supported the Khmer Rouge seeing as both Pol Pot and Mao Zedong were trying to instill complete revolutions in both societies. Pol Pot was able to live in what Joel Brinkley, author of Cambodia’s Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land, called “a luxury jungle house” due to the copious amount of money he was receiving from China—a lot of it from timber and mining (Brinkley 60). Still today, large mining and forestry projects in Cambodia are due to Chinese patronage and China remains one of the world’s largest importers of tropical timber from the region (Burgos & Ear 624, 631). Deforestation and mining has led to loss of livelihood in the Cambodian people and massive environmental damage.

In the 1990s, China set out to instigate a Chinese cultural revival in Cambodia, even though today only 2.5% of Cambodia has ethnic Chinese background (Burgos & Ear). As academics Burgos and Ear describes, there is a distinct Chinese influence in Cambodian education systems today—even though Brinkley belabors the point that almost all schools in Cambodia are incredibly corrupt and essentially ineffective. There are more Chinese-Cambodian social organizations and even Chinese TV channels than ever before (629). China can exercise this cultural imperialism due to its heavy monetary influence in the Khmer government.

Chinese president Hu Jintao visited Hun Sen in Cambodia
 in 2012. Taken from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_6420
-1442-1-30.pdf?120411130155

Presently, China gives more than 25% of Cambodia’s aid money, and $6.7 billion of Chinese capital has been used in Cambodia to build roads, dams, and other primary/secondary infrastructure (Brinkley 349).  For example, China offered Cambodia $600 million no strings attached loans for two bridges near Phnom Penh and a modern fiber-optic cable network (Burgos & Ear 624). Prime Minster Hun Sen even said that “loan grants from China have released Cambodia from certain kinds of political pressure from international countries…[Chinese aid] helps strengthen Cambodian political independence” (Brinkley 349). The aid in reality does come with strings attached. In order to receive Chinese monetary support, Cambodia has to support the “one-China” policy on Taiwan as well as comply with what China wishes to implement in Cambodia, even if it might be (or rather often is) detrimental to the Khmer people (Brinkley 349; Burgos & Ear). With China’s supposed “help” come consequences: “unlawful land-grabbing, choking of freedom of expression, illegal logging, unregulated mining, labor abuses, illicit resource exploitation, environmental damages to rivers, lakes, and water-dependent eco-systems” (Burgos & Ear 630). Essentially, the Cambodian government is aware of these consequences and turns a blind eye.

Mekong River in Kratie, Cambodia.
Taken by yours truly in December 2009.

A good example of Chinese imperialism in Cambodia is the hydroelectric dams that China seeks to install. China is currently building a fourth hydroelectric dam at the upper reaches of the Mekong River in China, even though this could have detrimental effects on the other countries, namely Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, that rely on the Mekong (Burgos & Ear 622). In Cambodia, water contribution from the Mekong is 70% during the dry season and is arguably the one country in the region most reliant on the Mekong (624, 633). China plans to install a hydroelectric dam in Cambodia as well, giving the countryside electricity and potentially opening up the possibility to sell excess energy to Vietnam and Thailand (622). Multiple NGOs and Cambodians, however, claim that the dam is poorly planned and will lead to human rights and environmental abuses (635). The Irrawaddy dolphins that normally thrive in Cambodia’s northern part of the Mekong are at the brink of extinction due to harmful aquatic practices (634). In mid-2004, Mekong River levels were at a record low, and there was a 50% drop in Cambodian fish catch from 2003 (634).  Indeed, only Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam are part of the Mekong River Commission--an organization founded in 1995 to agree upon sustainable development of the Mekong (634). 

See that small little "bump" in the water? That is an
Irrawadday dolphin! Taken by yours truly in December 2009.

According to Burgos and Ear, China sees Cambodia as in a “pivotal geostrategic position” (Burgos & Ear 615).  China needs to secure natural resources to sustain it’s growing and urbanizing population, and Cambodia can supply many of these natural resources. China is “thirsty” for natural resources such as timber, gas, oil, water, rubber, fertile cropland, and minerals (gold, iron ore, and silver), and has already supposedly secured rights to Cambodia’s off shore oil (630).

Regardless of the large amounts of aid that China is bestowing upon Cambodia to “help” the country, the consequences are detrimental and irreversible. It is unlikely that China will help with any of Cambodia’s real deep-rooted problems, and it is unlike that there will be any transparency in any Chinese-Cambodian deals. Cambodia’s repayment to China for their monetary help is to give them anything and everything—at the expense of the Cambodian people.

Works Cited

Brinkley, Joel. Cambodia's Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land. New York, New York: PublicAffairs, 2011. Print.

Burgos, Sigfrido & Sophal Ear. "China's Strategic Interests in Cambodia: Influence and Resources." Asian Survey 50.3 (2010): 615-639. Print. 

Gerd, Albrecht et. al. "Circular Earthwork Krek 52/62: Recent Research on the Prehistory of Cambodia." Asian Perspectives 39.1-2 (2000): 20-46. Print.

The Great (illegal) Timber Trade

I just finished reading Joel Brinkley's book Cambodia's Curse: A Modern History of Development for my Independent Study Seminar. Although the writing is honestly a bit elementary (which also on the other hand opens it up to a wider audience), the book does provide a wealth of information. A wealth of information, except that (in my opinion) he fails to organize his chapters well with subject headings or at least string the book chronologically.

There are a few solitary sentences of the book that I find particularly problematic (for example on page 5 when Brinkley states that modern Cambodia has not changed since the Middle Ages), but besides this, Brinkley has researched and knows Cambodia well. Because of his vast experience in Cambodia, Brinkley has a tendency to over-assume and make blanket statement about numerous aspects of Cambodian society and government. Although I am no expert on Cambodian history and cannot directly refute any of his statements, his language is rather dogmatic.

The overwhelming majority of the book covers Cambodian history after independence from France in 1953, with only a few references to the ancient Khmer Empire and French influence on Cambodia. Much of the book covers the U.N. Occupation of Cambodia (and its failure to do anything substantial except help with the first free elections in 1993, according to Brinkley) in the early 90s and the corruption that is embedded in the government and how this adversely affects the people. The picture that Brinkley paints of Cambodia is, as I assumed before reading, very grim. His chapters go in circles describing the awful corruption that occurs within the government, and how unfortunately, NGOs and aid organizations (from grassroots to the World Bank) actually indirectly encourage this corruption rather than hinder it (which is debatable). Corruption, he describes, is an inherent feature of the Cambodian government today and functions like a hierarchical patronage system, similar to that during the Khmer Empire.

Cambodian Rosewood, taken from a website of a man who
says that it is endangered due to "general clearing of the land"
and not the small amount of exports. I beg to differ.

One offshoot about corruption that greatly intrigued me was Cambodia's illegal logging. Cambodian wood is absolutely stunning with unique coloration, and needless to say: much nicer than anything at IKEA. Deforestation continues to be a massive problem, and in top of this, the government is extremely tangled in a net of corruption so that NGOs, government aid, loans, etc. cannot even help the problem. The Cambodian government even reports faulty statistics on how much of the Cambodian forests are left. The International Monetary Fund found that only 1.7-3.4% of Cambodia still had primary growth (200 year old+) forests, but the Cambodia Forest Ministry stated there was 59%--a huge difference (the actual number is likely somewhere in-between, closer to the IMF's estimation) (Brinkley 292). As for forest cover, the U.N. reported that today Cambodia's land is 57% forested (in 2010), although this estimate likely includes tree plantations. In 1990, the number was 73%. The World Bank tried to funnel money to the save the forests, only to have their money squandered through systematic governmental corruption.

Illegal logging on a mass scale in Cambodia has its roots during the Khmer Rouge. During the Khmer Rouge's reign, which officially started in 1975, a lot of their funding came from illegal logging and wood exports to China and Thailand. China was actually a supporter of the Khmer Rouge, and essentially funded Pol Pot's luxury jungle villa. In fact, illegal logging supported the Khmer Rouge until it officially left Cambodia in 1993. That's right: contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge was still an active force in Cambodia until mid-1996 when Prime Minister Hun Sen offered them amnesty, and then basically inactive when Pol Pot died in April 1998.

The remnants of what was once a tree.

Still in 1995 after U.N. occupation, Cambodian military was illegally exporting teak, rosewood, and mahogany-like lumber to Thailand, raking in about $20 million a month (99, 157). One haul of illegal timber meant for Vietnam alone cost $13 million (270). Brinkley describes how military forces will come in the middle of the night to set aside land for logging. He depicts one incident in 2004 in which 800 villagers camped in a forest to prevent it from being clear cut, only to have a hand grenade thrown at them in the middle of the night (no one was killed) (176). In December 2002, 150 Cambodians protested outside of the Forestry and Wildlife Ministry against the deforestation and loss of livelihood--only to be attacked by the police leaving seven wounded and one dead. A lot of the loggers will donate money to supporting governmental public works, and therefore gain free reign to the forests. Acquiring this status only takes $100,000. The Cambodian government has authorized 3-4 million cubic meters of illegal logging, with the international NGO Global Witness stating that Hun Sen's 4,000 men bodyguard unit "serves as a nationwide timber trafficking service." In fact, Global Witness was denounced by Hun Sen who threatened to terminate the workers' visas and sue the NGO (177).

Most recently, NPR released a story about Chinese growth and the impact this has on Cambodian logging. Because Thailand, a country with similar wood, has placed and enforced strict regulations about their wood leaving the country, Cambodia faces extra pressure to supply the Chinese market. Moreover, China is one of the biggest foreign aid donors to Cambodia. But when it comes to illegal logging: in a country with one of the lowest GDPs in the world, who wouldn't try and make money any way possible? And with stories about journalists who uncover the illegal logging being killed, who is going to tell? And with NGOs who report the problem being threatened to leave, what can we do?

[Shameless self promotion: Check out what I wrote about deforestation in Alaska last semester!]

Works Cited:

Brinkley, J. (2011). Cambodia's Curse: The Modern History of a Troubled Land. New York, New York: PublicAffairs.